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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND JOINDER IN  
MASS COPYRIGHT TROLL LITIGATION 
JASON R. LAFOND*
INTRODUCTION 
 
A copyright troll, roughly defined, is a person or entity that ac-
quires a (usually narrow) license from an original copyright holder 
for the sole purpose of suing and obtaining settlements from alleged 
infringers.1  This business model has been used with success in Eu-
rope2 and is now showing up in United States courts.  These suits are 
akin to recording industry litigation on steroids: hundreds, even thou-
sands, of defendants are sued together in a single action.3  Nearly 
100,000 defendants were sued in such actions in 2010.4  With settle-
ments averaging $2,500, suits on this scale can be quite lucrative.5  
These suits, however, should raise alarm.  While sophisticated plain-
tiffs use mass litigation to avoid the expense of filing multiple suits in 
different courts,6
 
Copyright © 2012 by Jason R. LaFond. 
 individual justice and fairness are threatened when 
legally unsophisticated individuals are brought into the court system 
on such a large scale.  Most defendants have no knowledge of con-
* J.D., magna cum laude, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. See generally Who Are Copyright Trolls?, FIGHT COPY RIGHT TROLLS, 
http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (discussing the evils of 
copyright trolls and recent mass copyright infringement cases).  
 2. One European group estimated that license holders can earn 150 times more 
money from suing illicit downloaders than from selling their copyrighted work through 
iTunes and other legal stores.  Ernesto, Illegal Downloads 150x More Profitable Than Legal 
Sales, TORRENT FREAK (Oct. 9, 2009), http://torrentfreak.com/illegal-downloads-150x-
more-profitable-than-legal-sales-091009. 
 3. See, e.g., Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1–23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(accusing 23,322 unnamed BitTorrent users of copyright infringement); Achte/Neunte 
Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co. KG v. Does 1–4,577, 736 F. Supp. 2d 212, 213 (D.D.C. 
2010) (naming 4,577 defendants who had downloaded plaintiff’s movie over the Internet). 
 4. Matthew J. Schwartz, Mass P2P Lawsuits Targeted Nearly 100,000 Last Year, 
INFORMATION WEEK (Feb 7, 2011, 1:16 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/ 
internet/policy/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229201274. 
 5. Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Copyright Infringement Defendants Turn the Table on Righthaven, 
MediaShift (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/12/copyright-
infringement-defendants-turn-the-table-on-righthaven335.html, 
 6. Id. 
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cepts such as personal jurisdiction7 and joinder8 and lack the means 
to hire a lawyer to defend themselves in often far-flung courts.  Most 
will simply pay the settlement demanded by the plaintiff, with no 
knowledge of their rights.9
I argue in this Essay that courts should be concerned about these 
suits and should ask two questions of a plaintiff early on in a copyright 
troll suit to ensure that the processes of the court are not being 
abused: First, does the court have personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants?
  
10  And second, are the defendants properly joined in a sin-
gle suit?11
This Essay will first discuss the litigation, arguing that the proper 
time to ask these questions is before discovery; the Essay will then de-
scribe the technology involved as it is relevant to the issues of personal 
jurisdiction and joinder; and finally it will detail the two inquiries 
courts should make in these cases. 
   
I.  THE LITIGATION 
Copyright troll suits are essentially inverted mass tort cases.12  In 
traditional mass torts, numerous plaintiffs bring related claims against 
a (most often) well-endowed corporate defendant based on one 
product or act.13  By contrast, copyright troll suits involve a single cor-
poration suing numerous individual defendants based on numerous 
separate acts.14
These suits follow a familiar pattern.  First, a plaintiff will pur-
chase a narrow license to a copyrighted work and use special software 
to obtain the Internet protocol (“IP”) addresses of the Internet ser-
vice provider (“ISP”) accounts being used to download the copy-
righted work.  Next, the plaintiff will establish itself in the jurisdiction 
in which it wishes to bring suit.  The plaintiff will then file suit against 
numerous Doe defendants, identifying defendants only by their IP 
   
 
 7. For a discussion of personal jurisdiction requirements, see infra Part III. 
 8. For a discussion of joinder requirements, see infra Part IV. 
 9. See Schwartz, supra note 4 (noting that mass copyright lawsuits are controversial 
and considered “predatory” because they coerce plaintiffs into settling without knowledge 
of their rights).  
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Others have referred to such suits as “reverse private attorney general litigation.”  
See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual 
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1696 (2005). 
 13. Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-
Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 994 (1995). 
 14. Opderbeck, supra note 12, at 1696. 
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addresses.  Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff will move ex parte for expe-
dited discovery.15  Courts often grant these motions in these circums-
tances as a matter of course.16  Next, Rule 45 subpoenas are served by 
the plaintiff on ISPs, ordering them to provide to the plaintiff names 
of account holders corresponding to the IP addresses identified.17  
The ISPs often comply with the subpoenas, although some have be-
gun to push back.18
An additional tactic often used by copyright trolls is to obtain li-
censes to distribute pornographic movies through peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks and then to sue those who download the movie us-
ing those networks.
  Once the plaintiff has the name of the account 
holder, a letter is issued demanding payment in exchange for an 
agreement not to add the potential defendant’s name to the litiga-
tion.   
19
 
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1).  Usually a discovery conference is required first, FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(f), but in copyright troll cases, there are no identified defendants with whom 
to hold a conference.  Courts often grant these motions as a matter of course.      
  This tactic has the added benefit of embarrass-
ment, presumably further encouraging anyone threatened with suit to 
settle at an early stage to avoid having his or her name publicly linked 
 16. See, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–96, No. C–11–03335, 2011 WL 4502413, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (“When a defendant’s identify is not known at the time a com-
plaint is filed, courts often grant plaintiffs early discovery to determine the doe defen-
dants’ identities.”); Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–4, 589 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153 (D. Conn. 
2008) (noting that “courts routinely find the balance favors granting a plaintiff leave to 
take early discovery” in claims of copyright infringement against unknown defendants) 
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 
 17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 18. For example, in Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GBMH & Co. KG v. Does 1–2,094, 
plaintiffs served Time Warner Cable with subpoenas seeking identifying information about 
2,049 Time Warner Cable subscribers who plaintiffs claimed infringed on their copyright 
through the use of peer-to-peer file sharing software.  Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities in Support of Third Party Time Warner Cable Inc.’s Motion to Quash or Modify Sub-
poena at 2, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GBMH & Co. KG v. Does 1–2,094, No. 
10-453, 2010 WL 2553275 (D.D.C. May 13, 2010).  Time Warner filed a motion to quash or 
modify the subpoena, arguing primarily that it would not allow Time Warner a reasonable 
time to comply with the extremely large request and would constitute an undue burden.  
Id. at 9.  Time Warner also argued that the plaintiffs had improperly joined the defendants 
and thus the burden on Time Warner was due to “discovery abuses.”  Id. at 10.  
 19. See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–32, No. 3:11CV532-JAG, 2011 WL 6182025, at 
*2–3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).  The court noted,  
[T]he plaintiffs sought, and the Court granted, expedited discovery allowing the 
plaintiffs to subpoena information from ISPs to identify the Doe defendants. . . . 
Some defendants have indicated that the plaintiff has contacted them directly 
with harassing telephone calls, demanding $2,900 in compensation to end the 
litigation. . . . This course of conduct indicates that the plaintiffs have used the 
offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to gain the Doe defendants’ per-
sonal information and coerce payment from them. 
Id. 
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to such a product.  These tactics have led some to describe these suits 
as nothing more than settlement shakedown operations.20
The crucial time for a court to question personal jurisdiction and 
joinder is when a plaintiff moves for expedited discovery, because 
once discovery is allowed, the settlement shakedown can begin. 
 
II.  A PRIMER ON THE TECHNOLOGY 
Plaintiffs in these types of suits have recently put greater focus on 
the type of technology used by infringers.  As will be discussed more 
below, plaintiffs argue that the interactive, interdependent, and high-
ly connected nature of today’s sharing networks justify the bringing of 
a single suit against geographically dispersed defendants.  Because of 
this intensified focus on the technology, it is important to understand 
(as much as a lawyer can) how that technology works.  For the pur-
poses of this Essay, I will focus on the most popular type of file-sharing 
protocol known as “BitTorrent.”21
First, some terms that may be helpful are:
   
22
• Peers. Peers are devices connected to a sharing network. 
 
• Swarm. A swarm is a set of peers concurrently sharing a 
file, for example, a movie, or a bundle of files that are dis-
tributed together.  Swarms can be hundreds or even 
thousands of peers large and contain peers from across 
the United States and around the world. 
• Blocks. A shared file is divided into blocks that peers upl-
oad to and download from each other.  
• Torrent. A torrent is a file that organizes the sharing of 
content among peers. 
• BitTorrent. BitTorrent is a popular sharing network. 
• Tracker. A tracker is a server that assists in the communi-
cation between peers using the BitTorrent protocol and 
gathers statistics on download and upload speeds. 
• Bandwidth. Bandwidth represents the maximum rate of 
data transfer.  It is a “speed limit” for uploading and 
downloading.23
 
 20. See id. at *2 (“The plaintiffs seemingly have no interest in actually litigating the cas-
es, but rather simply have used the Court and its subpoena powers to obtain sufficient in-
formation to shake down the John Does.”).  
 
 21. For a description of BitTorrent technology, see Beginner’s Guide, What is BitTorrent?, 
BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/help/guides/beginners-guide (last visited Feb. 
18, 2012). 
 22. Many of these terms are also defined in Glossary, BITTORRENT, 
http://www.bittorrent.com/help/manual/glossary (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
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The basic idea behind BitTorrent is that dividing a single large 
file into small blocks leads to more efficient downloading.24  Peers at-
tempting to download the file do so by connecting to several other 
peers simultaneously and downloading different blocks of the file 
from different peers.  To facilitate this process, BitTorrent uses tor-
rent files.  In a BitTorrent network, a peer that wants to download a 
file (the “target file”) first downloads the torrent file associated with 
that target file.25  When this file is activated, it connects with a tracker.  
That tracker then enters a swarm, gathers a random set of peers that 
have the target file (the “swarm subset”), and establishes a connection 
between the connecting device and these other peers.  The now-
connected device then sends requests for blocks of the target file that 
it does not yet have to all the peers to which it is connected.26
An individual device cannot, however, connect to all peers in 
each swarm subset at the same time.  Each peer is allowed to share 
with only a fixed number (usually four) of other peers at a given time.  
In addition, the total number of available blocks being shared by all 
peers easily maxes out the available downstream bandwidth for a giv-
en device.  In other words, there are more blocks in the network than 
can be downloaded by one device.   
   
Because of these limits, a method was developed to make the 
most efficient use of limited capacity.  Which peers share with each 
other is determined by the current downloading rate from each peer, 
that is, each peer shares with the four peers that provide it with the 
fastest downloading rate.  This is a tit-for-tat system meant to discou-
rage free-riding: if a device is sharing at a higher rate, it will be able to 
download more quickly.27
 
 23. See Bandwidth, TECH TERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/bandwidth 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
  In addition, about every thirty seconds, 
each device randomly connects to an additional peer from which it 
has received a sharing request and begins to share with this peer, ex-
amining its downloading rate.  Now, with five peers, the peer in the 
sharing group with the slowest downloading rate is dropped.  This 
way, there is a constant search for the fastest download rate and peers 
 24. The Basics of BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/help/manual/ 
chapter0201 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 25. Frequently Asked Questions: What is BitTorrent?, BITTORRENT, www.bittorrent.com/ 
help/faq/concepts (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 26. The Basics of BitTorrent, supra note 24. 
 27. See Michael Piatek et al., Building BitTyrant, a (More) Strategic BitTorrent Client, 32 
LOGIN 8, 10 (2007), available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/arvind/papers/ 
login-bt.pdf (noting that BitTorrent’s “tit-for-tat strategy rewards contribution” in that “[a] 
client who contributes quickly tends to receive quickly”).  
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are continually shifting connections.  This process continues until the 
device has disconnected from the network. 
III.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Questions of jurisdiction go to the heart of a court’s power to 
render judgment against a defendant.  Although a defect in the 
court’s jurisdiction over a party is a personal defense that may be 
waived, when no defendant has appeared and a non-party may be sub-
ject to costly discovery, the court has a responsibility to look into its 
jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.28  This re-
sponsibility is even more important in these inverted mass tort actions 
where individuals, unfamiliar with the law and lacking means to ob-
tain a lawyer, are likely to settle rather than assert their rights, thereby 
waiving a right they did not know they had.29
Courts in these cases should ask plaintiffs to make a prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction before the power and processes of 
the court will be at their disposal.
 
30  As a refresher, absent a waiver, a 
court has no personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless such a de-
fendant is present or domiciled in the jurisdiction,31 has made pur-
poseful contact with the jurisdiction, or has a reasonable expectation 
of facing suit in the jurisdiction.32
Copyright plaintiffs have begun making the argument that the 
nature of the technology underlying BitTorrent justifies jurisdiction 
   
 
 28. Cf., e.g., Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 214 
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that by making a sua sponte inquiry into its personal jurisdiction a 
court properly exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the power to enter a de-
fault judgment); Sun v. Asher, No. 91-2646, 1992 WL 205671, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 
1992) (sua sponte dismissal of complaint against non-appearing defendant for lack of show-
ing of personal jurisdiction); U.S. Olympic Comm’n v. Does 1–10, No. C 08-3514, 2008 WL 
2948280 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (denying temporary restraining order after sua sponte 
examination of personal jurisdiction). 
 29. See Schwartz, supra note 4.  
 30. See, e.g., Frontera Resources Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer. Rep., 582 F.3d 393, 
402 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In the absence of any prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction . . . 
it [would be] inappropriate to subject [defendant] to the burden and expense of discov-
ery.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas 
Pension Fund v. Phencorp Reinsurance Co., 440 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
the court must determine if plaintiff “made out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, 
which is required before it is allowed to conduct discovery”). 
 31. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
 32. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1980) (ana-
lyzing and refining these central principles of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1958) (same). 
 2012] MASS COPYRIGHT TROLL LITIGATION 57 
over all defendants in these cases.33  Plaintiffs claim that users in a 
network like this are simultaneously receiving and transferring infor-
mation to and from one another and therefore are acting simulta-
neously and in concert with one another.34  This characteristic, they 
claim, links all out-of-state defendants to in-state defendants, thereby 
creating a sufficient connection for jurisdiction.35
This argument misrepresents the level of connectivity among 
such defendants.  As described above, the torrent sharing process is 
much more dynamic than any copyright plaintiff would like the courts 
to believe.
 
36
But even if it somehow could be shown that an out-of-state de-
fendant was connected through the network to an in-state defendant 
and that both individuals were sharing the copyrighted work with 
each other, this connection would still fail to satisfy existing jurisdic-
tional requirements.  The Constitution requires more than a hap-
penstance connection between two people over the Internet,
  For example, when a user connects to the torrent net-
work to download a file, she is connected only to a subset of the avail-
able swarm, not the whole swarm.  The members of this subset are 
chosen at random and are constantly changing.  Plaintiffs currently 
have no way of showing who was connected to whom when each in-
stance of infringement occurred.  In addition, a user can only con-
nect to peers that are on the network at the same time, further limit-
ing connectivity.  Furthermore, the intrinsic limit on the number of 
connections that a user can establish, described above, means that 
even within a subset not all peers online at the same time will actually 
be connected.  As all of these dynamics accumulate, it becomes nearly 
impossible to claim that any one defendant would be connected to 
any other defendant simultaneously.   
37
 
 33. See, e.g., DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does 1–240, No. 10 Civ. 8760(PAC), 2011 WL 
4444666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (offering one recent articulation of this all-
encompassing jurisdictional theory). 
 and it 
is inconceivable that the out-of-jurisdiction defendant made purpose-
ful contact with the jurisdiction or reasonably expected that his sign-
ing on to the network would subject him to litigation in the jurisdic-
 34. Complaint at ¶ 10, DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does, No. 10 Civ. 8760(PAC), 2011 
WL 4444666 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011). 
 35. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10. 
 36. See supra Part II. 
 37. See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding per-
sonal jurisdiction to be lacking even where defendants sold plaintiff a vehicle online, be-
cause “the lone transaction for the sale of one item does not establish that the Defendants 
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in [the jurisdiction]”). 
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tion.  Thus, the common arguments put forth by plaintiffs in these 
cases have neither a technological nor constitutional basis. 
Therefore, to make the required prima facie showing, a plaintiff 
should be obliged, at the very least, to show that the IP addresses 
against which the suit is initially brought correspond to an ISP ac-
count within the jurisdiction.38
IV.  JOINDER 
  This requirement would at least pre-
vent plaintiffs from suing individuals who reside hundreds or even 
thousands of miles away from the court and give the court some com-
fort that those subjected to its processes may actually reside in its ju-
risdiction.  Anything less does not satisfy due process requirements. 
Joining hundreds of unrelated defendants in a single suit makes 
litigation less expensive for plaintiffs by enabling them to avoid travel 
and to avoid the separate filing fees required for individual cases.39
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize defendants to be 
joined in one action only if there is “asserted against them jointly, sev-
erally, or in the alternative,” a claim or right to relief “with respect to 
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to 
all defendants will arise in the action.”
  
For defendants, however, this process presents tremendous problems 
of fairness and justice.  Even when the court finds personal jurisdic-
tion over multiple defendants, there is little to justify joining them in 
a single suit when they all may have wildly different circumstances and 
defenses. 
40  Even if all the requirements 
are met, however, joinder remains discretionary, and a court is per-
mitted to order separate trials to prevent prejudice.41
 
 38. See Digiprotect, 2011 WL 4444666, at *3 (endorsing this position in finding that 
plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the necessary long arm jurisdiction ex-
isted).  Information indicating whether an IP address corresponds to an ISP in the juris-
diction is easily obtained from publicly available sources.  See, e.g., IP-LOOKUP (Jan. 19, 
2012), http://ip-lookup.net. 
  Importantly for 
these types of cases, joinder is not justified merely because a plaintiff 
alleges that each defendant’s acts involve violations of the same statu-
 39. Schwartz, supra note 4. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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tory duty,42 or because defendants were using the same file sharing 
network.43
Plaintiffs in copyright troll cases attempt to avoid these barriers 
by mischaracterizing the connectivity of sharing networks and then 
arguing that defendants, by downloading and sharing simultaneously 
with other users, have engaged in a single transaction.
 
44  As with per-
sonal jurisdiction, however, when the dynamic nature of sharing in 
these networks is considered—particularly, as noted above, that it is 
virtually impossible that any two defendants (let alone all of them) 
were connected with each other simultaneously—any claim that de-
fendants were acting in concert begins to fall apart.  All plaintiffs can 
plausibly claim is that defendants were engaged in identical transac-
tions, and courts have held repeatedly that this is an insufficient basis 
upon which to sustain joinder.45
Furthermore, even if a plaintiff could somehow show definitively 
that each defendant’s account was simultaneously sharing and down-
loading from each other defendant, each instance of illegal down-
loading, although using the same network, is factually distinct.  As an 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania court stated: 
 
John Doe 1 could be an innocent parent whose Internet 
access was abused by her minor child, while John Doe 2 
might share a computer with a roommate who infringed 
Plaintiffs’ works.  John Does 3 through 203 could be thieves, 
just as Plaintiffs believe, inexcusably pilfering Plaintiffs’ 
property and depriving them, and their artists, of the royal-
ties they are rightly owed.  Given this panoply of facts, law, 
and defenses, . . . [j]oinder is improper.46
This is reason enough to sever via Rule 21, which allows the court “at 
any time, on just terms, [to] add or drop a party.”
  
47
 
 42. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Nassau County 
Ass’n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d. Cir. 1974). 
   
 43. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–11, No. 1:07-2828, 2008 WL 4823160, at *5 
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008). 
 44. Compare, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 WL 
4915551, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011) (rejecting such an argument), with Voltage Pic-
tures, LLC v. Does 1–5,000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011 WL 1807438, at *5–8 (D.D.C. May 
12, 2011) (accepting such an argument). 
 45. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 2011 WL 4915551, at *4 (rejecting a request for 
joinder based on identical transactions made by defendants). 
 46. BMG Music v. Does 1–203, No. Civ.A. 04-650 (CCN), 2004 WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 2, 2004). 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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Thus, in most of the mass copyright cases, for those defendants 
for which plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdic-
tion, all but one should be severed from the action and plaintiff 
should have to file individual cases against any other defendant it 
wishes to pursue. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts have a responsibility to make sure their processes are be-
ing used fairly.  Mass copyright troll cases raise concerns about creat-
ing unfairness and denying individual justice to those sued.  To make 
sure that the processes of the courts are not being abused, courts, at 
the expedited discovery stage, should examine issues of personal ju-
risdiction and joinder and refuse to move forward unless and until 
the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction 
and has justified the joinder of multiple defendants.  This will go a 
long way toward ensuring fairness and justice in these cases. 
 
